United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) by unknown
United States v. Locke,
529 U.S. 89 (2000)*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 951
IL BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 954
A. The Locke Decision .................................................................................. 954
1. Factual Background .......................................................................... 954
2. The H olding ....................................................................................... 959
B. Federal Preemption and Other Applicable Lat ...................................... 962
1. Legislative History: Ocean and Coastal Law ................................... 962
2. International Treaties ........................................................................ 968
III. THE LOCKE DECISION IS DISTINGUISHABLE ......................................................... 969
IV. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 971
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) authorizes, but does not
require, the United States Coast Guard to enact prophylactic measures
for regulating ocean vessel traffic, protecting waterway navigation, and
protecting the marine environment. I The United States Supreme Court
recently decided that individual states do not have the authority to enact
oil tanker laws and regulations that are more restrictive than the federal
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1. 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a) (1994). The Tank Vessel Act of 1936, which includes
PWSA, was originally enacted to "effect a 'reasonable and uniform set of rules and
regulations concerning ship construction.. ."' Ray v. Ad. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,
166 (1978) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 74-2962, at 2 (1936)).
PWSA. Citing the Supremacy Clause, z the Supreme Court, in United
States v. Locke, 3 held that a federal determination that a vessel is
sufficiently safe to navigate United States waters trumps contrary or
inconsistent state determinations.4 This Casenote questions the Locke
Court's holding.
Prior to the Locke decision, coastal states such as Washington,
pursuant to the "savings clauses" contained in the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA 90),5 enacted more stringent laws than those passed by
Congress. OPA 90 and its savings clauses6 establish liability standards
and financial prerequisites associated with the release of oil into the
marine environment.7  The State of Washington maintained that
Congress "expressly indicated its intent not to preempt state law in the
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.") (emphasis added)).
3. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
4. Id. at 115-16.
We have determined that Washington's regulations regarding general
navigation watch procedures, English language skills, training, and casualty
reporting are pre-empted.... The issue is not adequate regulation but political
responsibility; and it is, in large measure, for Congress and the Coast Guard to
confront whether their regulatory scheme, which demands a high degree of
uniformity, is adequate.
Id. at 116-17.
5. 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994). The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was enacted
subsequent to the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, in which more than 53 million gallons of
crude oil spilled into Prince William Sound, Alaska. The Exxon Valdez spill was the
largest in United States history. Both Congress and the State of Washington responded.
See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. at 94. The Oil Pollution Act outlines a
comprehensive strict liability system. It holds the responsible party strictly liable for all
clean-up costs and resultant damages flowing from an oil spill.
[T]he responsible party must report the oil spill if it is aware of the incident,
provide all reasonable requested cooperation with officials responsible for
removal of the oil, comply with any Section 311 clean-up order, and establish
that it exercised due care with respect to the handling of the oil.
JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 647 (3d ed.
1999); see, e.g., Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Trade Corp. of Del., 122
F.3d 1062, 1997 WL 560047 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
6. In a statute, a savings clause is "an exception of a special thing out of the
general things mentioned in the statute. Ordinarily a restriction in a repealing act, which
is intended to save rights, pending proceedings, penalties, etc., from the annihilation
which would result from an unrestricted repeal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 698 (5th
ed. 1983). At issue in Locke is whether the OPA 90 savings clauses protect state
authority to enact oil spill prevention regulations. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. at
102.
7. See generally Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and Financial
Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24
TUL. MAR. L.J. 481 (2000) (discussing the liabilities imposed during the full tenure of
OPA 90).
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field of oil-spill prevention when it passed § 1018 of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990."g The Supreme Court declined to apply such a broad
interpretation of section 1018. The Court emphasized the importance of
a uniform federal regime and applied an expanded preemption analysis
to strike down most of the challenged Washington laws concerning oil
tankers.
9
Locke can be distinguished from the cases upon which the Supreme Court
based its decision.' 0  Further, an application of the proper constitutional
standards and concurrent related federal statutes for determining state power
to regulate coastal waterways does not support the Locke Court's
conclusion." Consequently, this Casenote argues that while the importance
of a uniform federal regime controlling the design of oil tankers is
8. Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added),
rev'd sub nrom. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000). Section 1018 of OPA 90.
codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718, states in pertinent part:
(a) Preservation of State authorities...
Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall-
(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any
State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability
or requirements with respect to-
(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State. ...
(c) ,Wditional requirements and liabilities; penalties
Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 (46 U.S.C. 183 et seq.) or
section 9509 of title 26, shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect. the
authority of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof -
(1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements; or
(2) to impose, or to determine the amount of, any fine or penalty (whether
criminal or civil in nature) for any violation of law. relating to the discharge.
or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil.
33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994).
9. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. at 96-100.
10. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 391 (1992)
(declining to give broad interpretation of savings clause where such interpretation
disrupts federally established regulatory scheme); City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S.
57, 63-64 (1988) ('[A] federal agency [such as the Coast Guard] ... may pre-empt state
regulation' and hence render unenforceable state or local laws that are otherwise not
inconsistent with federal law." (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355,
368-69 (1986))); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141. 152-
54 (1982) (explaining field preemption as leaving no provision for state regulation of
matters at issue in the present case, such as design, construction, and manning of
tankers); Ray v. Ad. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 174 (1978) (holding that certain state
tanker specifications, such as pilotage requirements, limitations on tanker size, and
tanker desigu and construction rules, are preempted by PWSA and Coast Guard
regulations promulgated under PWSA).
11. See discussion infra Part II.B.I.
appropriately considered, the Court's decision goes too far by undervaluing
the development and implementation of state coastal management
programs 2 and other federal environmental and maritime statutes.
]I. BACKGROUND
A. The Locke Decision
1. Factual Background
The State of Washington holds some of the Nation's most vital
waters.' 3 The inland sea of Puget Sound 14 is of particular significance to
oil vessel traffic. Under the Agreement for a Cooperative Vessel Traffic
Management System for the Juan de Fuca Region of 1979,15 traffic
inbound from the Pacific Ocean through the Strait of Juan de Fuca,
regardless of United States or Canadian destination, is routed through
Washington's waters. Outbound traffic through the Strait of Juan de
Fuca, regardless of United States or Canadian origination, is directed
through Canadian waters. 16
Washington's Puget Sound is the destination and point of shipment for
12. "Management program" is the term to refer to the process by which a coastal
state.., proposes.., to manage land and water uses in the coastal zone so as
to reduce or minimize a direct, significant and adverse affect upon those
waters, including the development of criteria and of the governmental structure
capable of implementing such a program.... The Committee does not intend
to provide for management programs that are static but rather to create a
mechanism for continuing review of coastal zone programs on a regular basis
and to provide a framework for the allocation of resources that are available to
carry out these programs.
S. REP. No. 92-753, at 10 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 4784. For
additional discussion on management programs under the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA) generally, see Jack H. Archer & Robert W. Knecht, The U.S. National Coastal
Zone Management Program-Problems and Opportunities in the Next Phase, 15
COASTALMGMT. 103, 108 (1987).
13. These include the Columbia River estuary, which divides Washington from
Oregon; Grays Harbor; Willapa Bay; and most significantly Puget Sound. For additional
information about the significance of these resources to the American economy and the
current issues facing commerce in these waterways, see 13th Coast Guard District, at
http://www.uscg.mil/d13/ (last modified Sept. 2000).
14. Puget Sound is a 2,500 square mile inland sea consisting of inlets, bays,
channels, and more than 200 individual islands. Puget Sound sustains fisheries, plant
life, and animal life of immense value to the Nation and to the world. United States v.
Locke, 529 U.S. at 95.
15. Maritime Matters: Vessel Traffic Management System for the Juan de Fuca
Region, Dec. 19, 1979, U.S.-Can., 32 U.S.T. 377, 380.
16. Id. For additional information regarding the Juan de Fuca Region and the laws
governing its commercial activities, see USCG Puget Sound Vessel Traffic Service, at
http:llwww.uscg.mil/dl31units/vts/cvtsinfo.htmil (last modified Feb. 6, 2000) and People
for Puget Sound, at http://www.pugetsound.org (last visited Nov. 27, 2000).
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huge volumes of oil and petroleum products.Y Crude oil from Alaska
and other oil drill sites is regularly shipped via tankers into Puget Sound
to the many refineries located adjacent to the Sound in oil refiner
ports. 18 The immensity of these vessels, 19 the frequency of transport,:0
and the millions of tons of crude oil transported by such vessels,2 1 often
with but one or two layers of metal separating the crude oil from the
fragile Pacific waters, present serious risks. To help protect against
these risks, the Washington legislature created the Office of Marine
Safety.23  The Office of Marine Safety was tasked with establishing
"standards for spill prevention plans to provide 'the best achievable
protection [BAP] from damages caused by the discharge of oil."'24 The
Office of Marine Safety accordingly promulgated the oil tanker design,
equipment, reporting, and operating requirements at issue in Locke.'
17. The total oil processed in Puget Sound annually is in excess of 7.6 billion
gallons. See Chapter 3: Oil Refineries: Introduction, at http./ww.pugetsound.org/p2/
reportfolder/ch3a.html (1996).
18. "Washington's close proximity to Alaskan crude oil, and the ease of shipping
that oil to Puget Sound, is the main reason that crude oil is refined in the Puget Sound
region. This has made Washington the sixth largest oil refining state in the country." I.
(citation omitted).
19. Some tankers have cargo capacities in excess of 175,000 deadweight tons. See
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. at 96, (citing 1 M. TUStANI, THE PETROLEUM SttPpING
INDUSTRY 79 (1996)).
20. For additional commercial information on Puget Sound. see Puget Sound
Business Journal at http://seattle.bcentral.com/seattle (last modified Jan. 29, 2001).
21. Of the many refineries in Puget Sound, five of the largest "process over
500,000 barrels of oil per day (one barrel of oil equals 42 gallons)." This equates to 21
million gallons of oil processed per day. Chapter 3: Oil Refineries: Introduction, at
http:llwww.pugetsound.orglp2/reportfolderch3a.html (1996).
22. Washington's waters have been subjected to oil spills and further threatened
by near misses. In December 1984, for example, the tanker ARCO Anchorage
grounded in Port Angeles Harbor and spilled 239,000 gallons of Alaskan crude
oil. The most notorious oil spill in recent times was in Prince William Sound.
Alaska, where the grounding of the Eron Valdez released more than 11
million gallons of crude oil and, like the Torrey Canyon spill before it. caused
public officials intense concern over the threat of a spill.
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. at 96 (emphasis added).
23. ld. at 97; see also About MSO Puget Sound, at http://www.uscg.mild 13/units/
msopuget/welcometomsops.html (last modified Sept. 1,2000).
24. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. at 97 (quoting WASH. REv. CODE § 88A6.040)3
(1994)).
25. Id. at 97.
The district court summarized the challenged regulations as follows:
1. Event Reporting - WAC 317-21-130. Requires operators to report
all events such as collisions, allisions and near-miss incidents for the
five years preceding filing of a prevention plan, and all events that
occur thereafter for tankers that operate in Puget Sound.
2. Operating Procedures - Watch Practices - [WAC 317-21-2001.
Requires tankers to employ specific watch and lookout practices
while navigating and when at anchor, and requires a bridge resource
management system that is the "standard practice throughout the
owner's or operator's fleet," and which organizes responsibilities
and coordinates communication between members of the bridge.
3. Operating Procedures - Navigation - WAC 317-21-205. Requires
tankers in navigation in state waters to record positions every fifteen
minutes, to write a comprehensive voyage plan before entering state
waters, and to make frequent compass checks while under way.
4. Operating Procedures - Engineering - WAC 317-21-210. Requires
tankers in state waters to follow specified engineering and
monitoring practices.
5. Operating Procedures - Prearrival Tests and Inspections - WAC
317-21-215. Requires tankers to undergo a number of tests and
inspections of engineering, navigation and propulsion systems twelve
hours or less before entering or getting underway in state waters.
6. Operating Procedures - Emergency Procedures - WAC 317-21-220.
Requires tanker masters to post written crew assignments and
procedures for a number of shipboard emergencies.
7. Operating Procedures - Events - WAC 317-21-225. Requires that
when an event transpires in state waters, such as a collision, allision
or near-miss incident, the operator is prohibited from erasing,
discarding or altering the position plotting records and the
comprehensive written voyage plan.
8. Personnel Policies - Training - WAC 317-21-230. Requires operators
to provide a comprehensive training program for personnel that goes
beyond that necessary to obtain a license or merchant marine document,
and which includes instructions on a number of specific procedures.
9. Personnel Policies - Illicit Drugs and Alcohol Use - WAC 317-21-
235. Requires drug and alcohol testing and reporting.
10. Personnel Policies - Personnel Evaluation - WAC 317-21-240.
Requires operators to monitor the fitness for duty of crew members,
and requires operators to at least annually provide a job performance
and safety evaluation for all crew members on vessels covered by a
prevention plan who serve for more than six months in a year.
11. Personnel Policies - Work Hours - WAC 317-21-245. Sets
limitations on the number of hours crew members may work.
12. Personnel Policies - Language - WAC 317-21-250. Requires all
licensed deck officers and the vessel master to be proficient in
English and to speak a language understood by subordinate officers
and unlicensed crew. Also requires all written instruction to be
printed in a language understood by the licensed officers and
unlicensed crew.
13. Personnel Policies - Record Keeping - WAC 317-21-255. Requires
operators to maintain training records for crew members assigned to
vessels covered by a prevention plan.
14. Management - WAC 317-21-260. Requires operators to implement
management practices that demonstrate active monitoring of vessel
operations and maintenance, personnel training, development, and
fitness, and technological improvements in navigation.
15. Technology - WAC 317-21-265. Requires tankers to be equipped
with global positioning system receivers, two separate radar systems,
and an emergency towing system.
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The regulations at issue include a variety of policies and procedures
intended to prevent oil and petroleum-related disasters. These
regulations include accident and other event reporting requirements,
navigational and lookout practices, engineering and monitoring
practices, prearrival tests and inspections, emergency procedures, and
various personnel training and skill requirements. 26
The Strait of Juan de Fuca is a major artery to the heart of oil refining
and processing facilities in Puget Sound. Many of the regulations appear
to be drafted with the peculiarities of these waters in mind. Under the
Washington rules, noncompliant vessels may be sanctioned,
operationally restricted, or most significantly, denied access or entry into
state waters.27 intertanko,2 a confederation of impacted tanker fleets,
challenged the rules on several related grounds. First, Intertanko argued
that the State of Washington, through its BAP policy, substantially and
impermissibly invaded the regulatory province of the Federal
Government.2 9 Second, Intertanko asserted that the imposition of such
regionally specific and unique requirements necessarily defeats any
national attempt to achieve a uniform standard for petroleum transport
by sea.30  Third, Intertanko contended that the allowance of such
16. Advance Notice of Entry and Safety Reports - WAC 317-21-540.
Requires at least twenty-four hours notice prior to entry of a tanker
into state waters, and requires that the notice report any conditions
that pose a hazard to the vessel or the marine environment.
Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Intertanko v. Lowry,
947 F.Supp. 1484, 1488-89 (W.D. Wa. 1996)), rerd sub nom. United States v. Locke.
529 U.S. 89 (2000).
26. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1057-58.
27. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 88.46.070-.090 (West 1996).
28. International Association of Independent Tanker Owners ("Intertanko") is a
trade association representing "approximately 80% of the world's independently owned
tanker fleet." United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. at 1142. About "60% of the oil imported
to the United States is carried on Intertanko vessels." Id. For additional information on
Intertanko, see Intertanko: For Safe Transport, Cleaner Seas and Free Competition. at
http://www.intertanko.com/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2000).
29. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. at 97. See also Malone v. White Motor
Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (stating that "[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone" of preemption analysis (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96.
103 (1963))); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating that
analyses of preemption issues begin "with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States [are] not to be superseded by [Federal Acts] unless that [is] the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.").
30. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. at 97. The arguments raised in this case
by Intertanko are consistent with its stated mission to advance "free competition" in the
oil transport industry. See hntertanko: For Safe Transport. Cleaner Seas and Free
differing regulatory regimes, within local political subdivisions of each
maritime nation, would render impossible the goal of national
governments to develop effective environmental and safety standards.3'
To underscore Intertanko's position and solicit intervention by the
United States, thirteen concerned governments of ocean-going nations
expressed significant distress, consistent with Intertanko's position,
through a diplomatic note directed to the United States.32 Specifically,
the note expressed apprehension at the inconsistent regulations among
the several states within the United States.33 It further contended that
such lack of uniformity would inescapably result in uncertainty and
confusion within the global marketplace with regard to transoceanic
petroleum shipment and transfer.34 Lastly, the note warned that such
inconsistency would set an unwelcome precedent for the thirteen signers
and other federally administered countries. 5 In sum, Intertanko and the
diplomatic note sought to have the Washington State regulations struck
down and argued that the PWSA and OPA 90 be recognized as the
exclusive and controlling oil tanker regime throughout all United States
ports and waterways.36
Groups interested in environmental preservation intervened in defense
of the Washington laws challenged by Intertanko.37 The state defendants
cited section 1018 of OPA 90 as Congress' express indication of intent
to abstain from preempting state law in the field of oil spill prevention.
38
Specifically, the state defendants argued that "by providing that nothing
in OPA 90 preempts states from imposing 'additional liability or
requirements with respect to the discharge of oil or other pollution by
oil,' .. . § 1018 grants states broad authority to enact oil-spill prevention
regulations." 39 Intertanko counterargued that the savings clauses only
Competition, supra note 28.
31. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. at 97.
32. Id. at 98. (citing Note Verbale from the Royal Danish Embassy, to the U.S.
Dep't of State 1 (June 14, 1996)).
33. Id.
34. See id. The United States declined to intervene at the district court level.
However, the United States did intervene at the Ninth Circuit level. Id.
35. Id.
36. John A. Duff, Supreme Court Strikes Down State Tanker Laws, 22(1) COASTAL
Soc'Y BULL., 2000, at 23.
37. Three environmental organizations intervened on behalf of the state defendants
at the appellate level. These groups included, "the Washington Environmental Council,
the Natural Resources Defense Council, and Ocean Advocates." Intertanko v. Locke,
148 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89
(2000). Although the issues in Locke arguably extend to other states beyond the State of
Washington, only Washington and its environmental groups were involved in this
litigation.
38. 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994); Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1059.
39. Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1059 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a)).
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apply to state laws concerning liability and penalties, not to the OPA 90
Titles concerning oil spill prevention. 40 Although the Ninth Circuit
found the state defendants' argument persuasive,4' the Supreme Court
applied a much narrower interpretation of the savings clauses within
OPA 9 
.42
In response to Intertanko's contention that the Washington laws
necessarily frustrate international uniformity in tanker regulation, the
state defendants urged that international agreements do not require strict
international uniformity, but rather a commitment to certain identified
minimum standards. 4 3  Intertanko asserted that the more significant
problem was inconsistency within a nation's borders, not exclusively
international inconsistency.44 Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court gave substantial weight to the international and intranational
consistency argument offered by Intertanko. To fully understand how
the Supreme Court reached its decision, it is necessary to review its
actual holding and the reasons on which the Supreme Court rested its
decision.
2. The Holding
The district court granted the State of Washington's motion for
summary judgment, effectively upholding each of the challenged
provisions.45 Intertanko filed a timely appeal with the Ninth Circuit.
After finding that the savings clauses of OPA 90 apply to all eight Titles
of the Act, the Ninth Circuit proceeded with a federal preemption
analysis. 46 "Because § 1018 of OPA 90 does not by its plain language
40. Id. See supra text accompanying note 6.
41. Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1059-60.
42. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105 (2000).
43. Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1063.
44. d. The international argument is clearly related to the intranational argument.
It is arguably more difficult to reach international agreements when the individual
signatories have inconsistent maritime laws within their own borders.
45. Intertanko v. Lowry, 947 F.Supp. 1484, 1500-01 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
46. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1060-69. The Supreme Court has
recognized three separate forms of federal preemption. Conflict preemption is "'when
compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when the state law 'stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."' California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989) (citing Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). Field preemption occurs when the federal law is
so complete "as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it." Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141.
affect preemption by federal Acts other than OPA 90, [the court
considered] whether such Acts otherwise impliedly or expressly preempt
the BAP Regulations. 47  The Ninth Circuit found only one of the
sixteen challenged provisions to be preempted by federal law. 48
Washington's "technology" requirements,49 which included a mandatory
global positioning system, two separate radar systems, and an
emergency towing system, were preempted by the PWSA.50 This
conclusion was based on the prior Supreme Court decision in Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Corp.5' The Ninth Circuit held that "the navigational
equipment requirements imposed [in WAC section 317-21-265] are
virtually indistinguishable from the radar and navigation devices that the
Ray Court found to be regulated preemptively by the PWSA." 52
The Washington Tanker Law challenged in Ray required '[tlwo radars in
working order and operating, one of which must be collision avoidance
radar.' ... The... Court, after reviewing the requirements of the Washington
Tanker Law, including the radar and navigational equipment requirements,
stated that 'the foregoing design requirements, standing alone, are invalid in
light of the PWSA and its regulatory implementation.'
53
Viewing the regulations as substantially similar, the Ninth Circuit
accordingly declined to uphold Washington's technology requirements
in Locke.
On appeal, the Supreme Court expanded the preemption analysis.
First, it found that the Ninth Circuit had interpreted the savings clauses
of OPA 90 in a manner too broad to pass muster.54 Second, the Court
expanded the application of Ray by expressly including the entirety of
Title I of PWSA in its purview." The combination of these holdings
153 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218. 230 (1947)).
Express preemption is where Congress explicitly states a conscious intent to usurp state
law in the text of the actual statute. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 505 U.S. 504,
516 (1992).
47. Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1060.
48. See id. at 1066.
49. See supra text accompanying note 25.
50. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1066.
51. 435 U.S. 151, 160 (1978).
52. Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1066.
53. Id. (quoting Ray v. At. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 160-61 (1978)).
54. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000).
We think it quite unlikely that Congress would use a means so indirect as the
saving clauses in Title I of OPA to upset the settled division of authority by
allowing States to impose additional unique substantive regulation on the at-
sea conduct of vessels. We decline to give broad effect to saving clauses
where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by
federal law.
Id.
55. Contrary to the suggestion of the Court of Appeals, the field of preemption
established by § 3703(a) cannot be limited to tanker 'design' and
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resulted in the determination that "Washington's regulations regarding
general navigation watch procedures, English language skills, training,
and casualty reporting are preempted.... It is preferable that the
remaining claims be considered by the Court of Appeals or by the
District Court within the framework ... discussed.' '5 Specifically, the
Court remanded the following regulations for preemption determination:
engineering operating procedures, prearrival test and inspection
operating procedures, emergency procedures, illicit drug and alcohol use
personnel policies, personnel evaluation policies, work hours policies,
training record keeping policies, management policies, and advance
notice of entry and safety report requirements.
57
The Supreme Court affirmed a "longstanding and constitutionally-
based" commitment to the federal government's goal of uniformity in
regulation among maritime commerce by concluding that the PWSA and
other federal laws, including OPA 90, create a comprehensive oil tanker
regime.58 However, the Court did note that federal law permits a state,
such as Washington, to regulate its ports and waterways in such limited
circumstances where "'the peculiarities of local waters... call for
special precautionary measures."' 59  The Supreme Court failed to
consider the application of several other highly relevant statutes
affecting state rights in navigable waterways and marine resources.w0 It
'construction,' terms which cannot be read in isolation from the other subjects
found in that section. Title II of the PWSA covers 'design, construction.
alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification,
and manning' of tanker vessels. Congress has left no room for state regulation
of these matters.
Id. at 111 (citation omitted) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (1994)).
56. Id. at 116.
57. Id. at 112-19.
The United States did not participate in these cases until appeal. Resolution of
these cases would benefit from the development of a full record by all
interested parties. We infer from the record that Washington is not now
enforcing its regulations. If, pending adjudication of these cases on remand, a
threat of enforcement emerges, the Court of Appeals or the District Court
would weigh any application for stay under the appropriate legal standards in
light of the principles we have discussed and with recognition of the national
interests at stake.
Id. at 116-17.
58. Duff, supra note 36, at 23.
59. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. at 109 (quoting Ray v. Ad. Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 171 (1978)).
60. See discussion infra Part ILB.I. The Court neither ackno%%ledged nor explained
this omission in its opinion.
further failed to consider the challenged Washington laws within the
purview of the narrow exception for local waters requiring special
precautionary measures.
B. Federal Preemption and Other Applicable Law
1. Legislative History: Ocean and Coastal Law
The Constitution delegates to Congress the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian tribes." 6' The Supreme Court first defined the nature of
Congress's commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden.62  The power to
"regulate commerce" includes the power and authority to regulate
navigation and thus the management of navigable waters.63 The ability
to preserve federal control over the nation's navigable waterways was
granted to the Secretary of the Army, who in turn delegated authority to
the Army Corps of Engineers, in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.
64
In 1936, Congress enacted the Tank Vessel Act, 65 which today
includes the PWSA, and pertains to maritime tanker transports generally.
The PWSA, subsequently amended by the Port and Tanker Safety Act of
1978,66 granted the Coast Guard authority to control ocean transports
and strengthened the standards for vessel construction and design in
direct response to the growing issue of oil pollution in the marine
environment. 67 The primary difference in the power of the Army Corps
vis-A-vis the Coast Guard is that the Army Corps has authority over all
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
62. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 83 (1824). "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is
something more-it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
carrying on that intercourse." Id.
63. Gibbons v. Ogden was itself a case concerning navigation rights within New
York waters. Id. at I.
64. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 9, 30 Stat. 1151 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1994)). See Thomas Addison & Timothy Bums, Tle Armny
Corps of Engineers and Nationwide Permit 26: Wetlands Protection or Swamp
Reclamation?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 624 (1991).
65. Tank Vessel Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-765, ch. 729, 49 Stat. 1889.
66. Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (1978).
67. See KALO, supra note 5, at 688.
[T]he Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to deny licensing to
applicants refusing to disclose information contained in the National Driver
Register; review criminal records of applicants for licensing; require testing
and revoke licenses, certificates of registry, and merchant mariners' documents
for drug and alcohol abuse....
The Act also establishes a nationwide planning and response system for
spills including spill contingency plans for facilities handling oil and hazardous
substances.
Id. at 690.
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construction activities and other obstructions to navigation within the
mean high-tide line of all tidal waters, as well as all navigable nontidal
waters.6" The Coast Guard has broad powers to control the movement of
the actual vessels in ports and other areas where hazardous conditions
exist, and its jurisdiction extends well beyond the mean high-tide line.69
As vessel traffic has continued to expand,70 so too has concern for
ecological factors within the marine environment.
7'
In the landmark case of Zabel v. Tabb,72 ecological factors were first
accepted as legitimate and proper areas of concern for enforcement of
the Rivers and Harbors Act. In Zabel, the court held that ecological
considerations must be taken into account when the Army Corps permits
68. See generally 33 C.F.R. §§ 329.4-.12 (1999) (defining the term "navigable
waters of the United States"). Mean high tide line is "the average of all high tides over
an 18.6 year cycle, as determined by the Department of Commerce." KAwo, supra note
5, at 46. No comprehensive federal definition of navigable waters exists. See Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). Originally, navigable waters were
understood to be those waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. See The Steamboat
Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). This definition was later expanded
to include all fresh waters used in commercial navigation in interstate and international
commerce. See Exparte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629, 632 (1884); The Propeller Genesee Chief
v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 453 (1851). For rivers, where the "ebb and flow"
test is not appropriate, the Court has held such waters must be navigable in fact and
regarded as public navigable rivers in law. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557
(1870). For an excellent summary of the history of the law on navigable waters, see
KALO, supra note 5, at 15-20.
69. See 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (1994).
70. "Between 1955 and 1968, the world tanker fleet grew from 2,500 vessels to
4,300 .... By December 1973, 366 tankers in the world tanker fleet were in excess of
175,000 tons... , and by 1998 the number of vessels considered 'tankers' in the
merchant fleets of the world numbered 6,739." United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 86, 96
(2000) (citations omitted).
71. For example:
Washington's water quality program has had a turbulent history and major
shortcomings. In 1988, the first Puget Sound Water Quality Management Plan
identified a number of weaknesses in the management of industrial discharges
and called for a series of changes to be made throughout the permit system. In
1990, the State Commission on Efficiency and Accountability in Government
studied [Washington State Department of] Ecology's waste discharge permit
program and made over 80 recommendations for improvement. In 1991. 12
environmental groups, including People for Puget Sound, petitioned EPA to
either correct the problems with Washington's water pollution control program
or end the delegation of the program to Washington State. Even with all the
attention paid and effort made to improve the wastewater discharge permit
program, many concerns remain.
People for Puget Sound, Industrial Pollution in Puget Sound: Erecutive Summar, at
http://www.pugetsound.orgp2/execsunzhtnzl (1995-97).
72. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
actions under the National Environmental Policy Act.73 The National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)74 is a significant piece of federal
environmental legislation in that it embodies a comprehensive national
policy of preserving and protecting the environment.75  "It does not
prohibit agency action that may result in environmental degradation, but
it requires the environmental costs of any major agency action to be
disclosed to the public and to be a significant consideration in the
1176decision-making process.
In 1972, Congress enacted a series of statutes that had a direct bearing
on the impact of commerce on the marine environment. These include
The Clean Water Act (CWA),77 the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA), 78 and the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA).79
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act of
1973 (ESA).80 Each statute is briefly discussed below.
The CWA was enacted to protect and preserve the quality of the
nation's waters and to further expand the power of the Army Corps of
Engineers by granting authority to regulate "the discharge of dredged or
filled material into the navigable waters." 8' It essentially makes all
discharge of pollutants into the Nation's waters illegal unless otherwise
provided by statute. 82 The statute itself creates an inherently unstable
relationship between the Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA. 3
Specifically, except for dredge and fill activity, the statute names the
EPA as the administrator of the Act.84 "The EPA sees itself as having an
73. Id. at 211,213.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1994).
75. KALO, supra note 5, at 108.
76. Id. For more on NEPA, see Joseph Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth about NEPA, 26
OKLA. L. REv. 239 (1973).
77. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-240, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1251-1265, 1281-1292, 1311-1328, 1341-
1345, 1361-1376 (1994)).
78. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280
(1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1994)).
79. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027
(1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1362, 1371-1384, 1401-1407
(1994)).
80. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1972)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460k-1, 4601-9, 668dd, 715i, 715s,
1362, 1371, 1372, 1402, 1531-1543 (1994)).
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994). Section 404 of CWA uses the term "navigable
waters." Note that the definitional section of the statute defines navigable waters as the
(arguably much broader) "waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
The meaning of the later phrase is still a subject of litigation.
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994). "Except as in compliance with this section and
section[ ] ... 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful." Id.
83. KALO, supra note 5, at 128.
84. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(1994); KALO, supra note 5, at 128.
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obligation to protect the environment from degradation; the Corps sees
its role as making a determination of whether, after consideration of all
the relevant factors, the proposed project, for which a permit is
requested, is in the 'public interest."' S Both agencies play an active,
albeit not always consistent, role in water pollution prevention, clearly a
significant issue in the oil transport industry.
Unlike the CWA, the CZMA outlines a significant intergovernmental
relationship of direct importance to the several states vis-at-vis the
federal government. The primary purpose of the CZMA is to provide
federal funding for states to develop and administer coastal programs
according to the guidelines enumerated in the statute.86 The CZMA
"generally defines the coastal zone to include the territorial sea and
adjacent lands 'to the extent necessary to control shorelands, the uses of
which have a direct and significant impact on the coastal waters.' Each
state defines the limits of its coastal zone in its management program."10
The most significant provision of the CZMA is its reverse preemption
feature. Section 1456(c) requires the federal government to be
consistent with state regulations concerning the coastal zone
management of that state. 9 Essentially, the Act operates to provide
federal funding for states to develop and administer coastal programs
according to the guidelines set out in the Act. However, it further
establishes a reverse preemption whereby a state regulation will trum p
federally construed regulations so long as the objectives are consistent.
Under this provision, state regulations that have objectives consistent
with stated federal policy preempt federal regulations that are in conflict
85. See KLO, supra note 5, at 167. "The EPA-Corps philosophical disagreement
is most pronounced on the questions of 'no practicable alternative' and "mitigation'
measures. Neither entity will readily give ground on these issues ..... Id. For more
information on the relationship between the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers, see
id. at 167-86.
86. See 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1994).
87. KALo, supra note 5, at 202.
88. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)-(d) (1994).
89. The Act "currently require[s] consistency... with 'the enforceable policies of
approved State management programs.' KALO, supra note 5, at 228.
90. The constitutionality of this provision is hotly debated. See Jack H. Archer &
Joan M. Bondareff, Implemzentation of the Federal Consistency Doctrine-Luisftul and
Constitutional: A Response to Whitney, Johnson & Perles, 12 HARv. ENVT.. L REv. 115
(1988); Scott C. Whitney, George R. Johnson, Jr., & Steven R. Perles, State
Implementation of Coastal Zone Management Consistency Provisions: Ultra Vires or
Unconstitutional?, 12 HARv. ENvT. L. REv. 67 (1988).
with the state regulations. 9'
Unlike the CWA or CZMA, the MMPA focuses directly on the
protection of marine mammals. The MMPA establishes a broad
moratorium on marine mammal takings.92 The MMPA's key standard
for identifying protected classes of marine mammals is "optimum
sustainable population" (OSP). OSP is the population of a particular
species of marine mammal "that is at a level of maximum ecological
productivity, that is at the limit of the environment to sustain healthy
populations indefinitely, and that does not adversely affect the
ecosystem of which it is a part." 93 The primary variable in the OSP is
maximum productivity.94  The National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS), Administrator of the MMPA, adopted regulations emphasizing
maximum productivity over the health of the marine ecosystem.95 When
a species is below OSP (as measured by maximum productivity), it is
considered depleted and the nonwaivable moratorium goes into effect.
96
All commercial or other nonscientific activity identified as presenting a
risk to the continued survival of the species must then be terminated
under the Act.97 Although the MMPA has strict language concerning the
preservation of marine mammals, it is substantially less restrictive than
the ESA.
The ESA requires federal agencies to "insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency.., is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species. Any agency seeking to undertake such action
must consult the service having jurisdiction over the relevant endangered
91. For example, assume a federal policy to significantly curtail the discharge of
oil pollutants into navigable waters. If the federal government passes a law permitting
no increase in current oil pollutant discharge rates, and a state government (through its
coastal management program) passes a law requiring a 1% reduction in oil pollutant
discharge rates, the state regulation trumps the federal regulation. The preemption
occurs when the state regulation is consistent with the federal policy. Here, the only
difference between the state regulation and the federal regulation (both of which arc
consistent with federal policy) is that the state regulation is more aggressive in its
implementation of the federal policy.
92. See 16 U.S.C. § 1362-63 (1994).
93. Sanford E. Gaines & Dale R. Schmidt, Wildlife Population Management
Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 6 ENvTL. L. REP. 50,096, 50,101
(1976).
94. See KALO, supra note 5, at 556.
95. See James A. R. Nafziger, The Management of Marine Mammals After
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, 14 WILLAMETTE L.J. 153, 171 (1977)
(arguing that NMFS's emphasis on productivity rather than populations is contrary to
legislative intent but has been embraced by leading marine mammal scientists).
96. KALO, supra note 5, at 556-57.
97. See 16 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
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species; the service then issues a biological opinion that details how the
proposed action "affects the species or its critical habitat," including the impact
of "incidental takings" of the species. If a species might be endangered by the
agency action, the service suggests "reasonable and prudent alternatives" to the
agency's proposal. The agency is not required to adopt the alternatives
suggested in the biological opinion; however, "li]f (the Secretary] deviates from
them, he does so subject to the risk that he has not satisfied the standard of
section 7(a)(2)." 99
Whenever the acting agency's undertakings would be halted by the ESA,
the head of the agency can petition a special Endangered Species
Committee for an exemption.' The exemption is extremely narrowly
construed and particularly difficult to obtain.'
Puget Sound supports a vibrant ecosystem of various plants, fishes,
and mammals. However, continued industrial contamination threatens
the longevity of the fragile ecosystem. The oil industry is one of the
most significant culprits of sustained waste dumping.1'2 Pollution in the
water also affects the health and safety of nearby beaches and other
coastal lands. The various federal statutes discussed above clearly apply
to land within the jurisdiction of the federal government. However,
much of the nation's coastal land falls within the ambit of individual
state jurisdiction.
Under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,103 the federal government
"granted the states ownership to and proprietary use of all lands under
their navigable waters for a distance of three geographical miles from
their coastlines, or to the historic seaward boundaries as they existed at
the time the states became members of the Union.''04 The land grant
also stated that "the right and power to manage, administer, lease,
develop, and use the said lands and natural resources all in accordance
with applicable State law be, and they are, subject to the provisions
hereof, recognized, confirmed, established and vested in" that State. t05
The federal government retained the right to "all its navigational
servitude and rights in and powers of regulation and control of said lands
99. Tribal Vill. of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted).
100. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h) (1994).
101. See id. § 1536(h).
102. See People for Puget Sound, Industrial Pollution in Puget Sound: Executive
Sumnarv, at http://www.pugetsound.org/p2/execsun.html (1995-97).
103. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified as amended
at43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1315 (1994)).
104. KALO, supra note 5, at 371.
105. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce,
navigation, national defense, and international affairs, all of which shall
be paramount to, but shall not be deemed to include, proprietary rights of
ownership."'' 0 6 Essentially, the federal government expressly stated an
intent to retain any constitutional power to regulate coastal waters under
the Commerce Clause. 10 7 However, not only was this express statement
omitted from the CZMA, but it was arguably replaced by the language
establishing the reverse preemption power.
Each of these statutes has application in the oil tanker industry or the
management of state property interests, but they are not the sole
regulation of the coastal waters. In addition to domestic regulation of
the marine environment, various international treaties have been signed
to further the preservation of ocean resources. These treaties provide
additional guidelines and regulations concerning the transport of
dangerous goods via ocean vessels.
2. International Treaties
Several international conventions have squarely addressed oil
pollution and marine environment preservation. The 1954 Oil Pollution
Prevention Convention prohibited discharge of oil and oily mixtures into
the sea in identified areas of particular concern. 08 The 1969 Convention
on Intervention on High Seas presents signatory nations significant
authority to "prevent, mitigate, or eliminate" risk to the coastal
environment. 9  The 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage provides a legal basis for damages claims for injuries
to the territorial sea and coast of a signatory state." t0  The 1971
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage supplements the 1969
Liability Convention's compensation limits and provides additional
compensation to individuals who suffer the requisite pollution damage
but are unable to obtain remuneration under that Convention."' The
106. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1994).
107. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes...." Id.
108. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 2990, 2992.
109. Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29,
1969, art. I, para. 1, 26 U.S.T. 765, 767.
110. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, amended
by 1984 Protocols Amending the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions on Oil Pollution
Damage, Nov. 6, 1985, 1985 U.S.T. LEXIS 231, *4-5.
I1l. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, amended by 1984 Protocols
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1973 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)
and the 1978 protocol supercede the 1954 Convention and extend the
scope significantly' 1 2 The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention offers
substantial opportunities for proactive, global pollution prevention."
"Although international efforts have had a significant effect in the area
of liability and clean-up costs for pollution from oil ... many
commentators believe that the conventions have actually provided very
little relief from chronic discharges from vessels. The major weakness
of the conventions is inadequate coastal-state enforcement authority
,"114
I1. THE LOCKE DECISION IS DISTINGUISHABLE
The facts of Locke are distinguishable from the facts of prior Supreme
Court decisions. In Ray, the Court held that while some state safety
regulations applicable to tankers were preempted, others were not. The
finding of implied preemption was limited to tanker design, such as the
Washincton technology requirements and construction. In contrast, the
"tug-escort" requirement was not a design requirement, but "more akin
to an operating rule arising from the peculiarities of local waters that call
for special precautionary measures."' 15
Puget Sound is a complex and dynamic waterway. It contains more
than two hundred individual islands, hundreds of bays and channels, and
is subjected to heavy precipitation and freezing winter storms. Where
the Secretary of the Army has not imposed a similar requirement for tug
escorts in light of the peculiarities of local waters, the "State's
requirement need not give way under the Supremacy Clause. ' 16 The
Ray Court further qualified its holding by saying "'operating rule[s]',
unlike design and construction requirements, are not automatically
subject to field preemption by the PWSA."" 7  In contrast, the
Amending the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions on Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 6,
1985, 1985 U.S.T. LEXIS 231, *5-6.
112. The MARPOL Protocol, Feb. 17, 1978, 1978 U.S.T. LEXIS 322.
113. See generally Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Dec.
10, 1982,21 I.L.M. 1261.
114. KALO, supra note 5, at 692.
115. Rayv. Al. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 171 (1978).
116. Id. at 171-72.
117. Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F. 3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted1
(quoting Ray, 435 U.S. at 171), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89
(2000).
regulations in Locke were primarily operating rules, with several
personnel policies, management guidelines, and technology
requirements. The Court must balance the interests of the state with the
federal government. Where the facts are not controlled by precedent, the
Court must move to a balancing test that considers both the peculiarities
of local waters that call for special precautionary measures and the need
for a uniform federal regime controlling the design and operation of oil
tankers.
Washington and other coastal states have a special interest in the
marine environment. The CZMA acknowledges a concern for local
government control over local environmental risks and other
environmental issues consistently recognized under federal policy. The
Locke Court failed to consider these important local interests. The
federal government has a special interest in promoting international
commerce. The regulations at issue in Locke were not so extreme as to
create a more than incidental or direct extraterritorial impact on the
operations of the Intertanko membership." 8 The Supreme Court holding
completely strips coastal states of any power to regulate the entrance of
tankers into state waters. Locke ignores the CZMA reverse preemption
clause as well as the "peculiarities of local waters" exception in the Ray
holding itself. The CZMA and other previously discussed statutes
evince a concern for local environmental control that the Court did not
take into account in Locke. The citizens of the coastal states must bear
the weight of tanker disasters, but they have little if any means by which
to proactively mitigate the risk of catastrophe.
A better alternative for the Court would be to consider the impact of
the regulation on the industry as weighed against its preventative
benefits. In circumstances where the regulation bears a rational relation
to the potentiality of disaster, the regulation should be given presumptive
power over the tankers within those state waters. The rational relation to
disaster drives the presumption. In other words, the burden of persuasion of
the unreasonableness of the regulation as applied to the tankers should
rest on the challenging party, not the state. However, if the relation is
not sufficiently tied to the mitigation of risk, the burden should be borne
by the state to prove that the regulation is necessary because of the
peculiarities of local waters. The critical factors triggering the
presumption in favor of local regulation are the high risk of disaster and
the correlative nature of the regulations designed to avert that disaster.
118. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000). See also Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429 (1968). Zschernig is the only case in which the Supreme Court struck
down a state statute as violative of the foreign affairs power on the ground that it had
"more than 'some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries."' Id. at 434, 440
(quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)).
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Upon a showing that such correlation is absent, as measured by a
rational relation to the risk involved, the burden should shift to the state
to show the reasonableness of the regulation vis-a-vis the peculiarities of
local waters that call for special precautionary measures.
The courts should give great deference to the findings of state marine
safety offices. Marine safety offices have the benefit of specific and
complex scientific knowledge of the local environs. Where the
intrusiveness of local law is slight, courts should be loath to set them
aside on constitutional or other grounds. The Locke Court, in its strict
reading of Ray, unnecessarily limited previously available discretion
enjoyed by the coastal states to balance local dangers against economic
burdens to industry. Coastal states have no alternative means whereby
to proactively regulate the use and often destruction of marine and
coastal environments. Placing full faith and credit in the federal
regulatory scheme, particularly in environmental law, oversimplifies and
underemphasizes a significantly local matter. It is unreasonable to
assume the federal government can or will adequately manage the health
and welfare of local marine environments.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Locke Court appropriately applied a preemption analysis and
correctly considered the importance of a uniform federal regime
controlling the design of oil tankers. However, the Court failed to
consider the various coastal, environmental, and international laws and
treaties that balance commercial interests with state rights and ecological
health, and subsequently arrived at the wrong result. Because the Court
did not consider the CZMA and various other statutes, it never reached
the reverse preemption clause as applied to the development and
implementation of state coastal management programs. The Locke
Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for placing too much emphasis on the
OPA 90 savings clauses. The Locke Court arguably overemphasized the
"preemptive analysis" portion of the Ray holding while it simultaneously
underemphasized the "preservation of state authority to regulate the
peculiarities of local waters" portion of the Ray holding. In sum, the
Locke Court reached its decision, not by properly considering all statutes
applicable to the issue, but by narrowly concluding that all state
regulations for oil tankers are preempted by federal standards under the
Ray decision.
The SLA granted states the ownership of all lands under navigable
waters up to three miles from the mean high tide line. The ESA requires
that any action authorized by a federal agency not be likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species. The CZMA allows
for reverse preemption of federal to state laws where states adopt coastal
management programs for coastal areas, so long as they are consistent
with federal policy. The Locke holding substantially reduces these
intended allocations of state power to protect local, state-owned coastal
environments, and removes years of progress in environmental law. The
federal government now has absolute authority on a matter of arguably
local concern. Consequently, the Supreme Court holding in Locke
created a substantial obstacle for coastal states seeking to protect the
local marine environments through regulations aimed at diminishing the
risk of pollution and oil spills by reserving that duty to the federal
government.
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